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WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
Richard G. Huber* 
Without question, Mr. Justice Douglas, of all who have been 
members of the United States Supreme Court, deserves the title of 
premier environmentalist. His life and his writings mark his dedica-
tion to the protection and preservation of nature. It has been sug-
gested that Mr. Justice Douglas' sensitivity to environmental pro-
tection developed from a youth spent in those parts of the North-
west where the forces of nature are rugged and unyielding but the 
balance of nature is precariously fragile. 
Those who have written about nature most knowledgeably and 
understandingly seldom describe, except superficially, those parts 
of the earth where the environment is readily usable and difficult 
to damage in any permanent way. Underlying Willa Cather's Ne-
braska tales, Ole Rolvaag's Giants in the Earth, and Thomas 
Hardy's novels is the struggle of man to live with difficult, uncon-
querable, and recalcitrant nature and the need to work with, rather 
than against, natural forces and the environment. In Wuthering 
Heights, Emily Bronte, with a compelling transcendental mysti-
cism, personifies the harsh and grim moors of Yorkshire as a living 
force. It is as if those who live successfully in what the generality of 
men may consider a difficult and even dangerous environment, 
learn to appreciate it deeply and learn to cooperate rather than to 
destroy. A respect for nature often generates a love of it, as can be 
witnessed in the writings of Thoreau and McKaye. 
Few people have been as sensitive as Mr. Justice Douglas to the 
great values that come to man from contact with the unpolluted and 
natural environment. While opinions of the United States Supreme 
Court on environmental issues have only recently become numer-
ous, the Douglas opinions are consonant with his civil libertarian 
decisions. He values man as an individual and, therefore, places 
primary emphasis on those aspects of life that assure the strength-
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ening of man's individuality and his ability to expand his spiritual 
and intellectual as well as his physical life. 
As is well known, Mr. Justice Douglas accepted, in his dissent in 
Sierra Club u. Morton, I Professor Stone's proposaP that inanimate 
objects should have standing to sue for their own preservation.3 
Thus, "[t]hose who hike ... [Mineral King], fish it, hunt it, 
camp in it, frequent it, or visit it merely to sit in solitude and 
wonderment are legitimate spokesmen for it, whether they may be 
few or many."4 He shared the distrust which those persons who find 
great value in the natural environment, harbor for the official gov-
ernment agencies whose presumed function is to represent the pub-
lic interest, but whose tendency is to interpret it in economic, rather 
than in broad social terms.5 
Mr. Justice Douglas' sensitivity to environmental injury was also 
responsible for his opinions for the Court in United States u. Repub-
lic Steel Corp.6 and United States u. Standard Oil Co., 7 in which he 
found violations of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.8 These cases 
required close consideration not to the technical language of the 
statutory provisions, but to their underlying and critically impor-
tant environmental purposes. 
In Illinois u. City of Milwaukee9 Douglas found for the court that 
the federal common law permitted the abatement as a nuisance of 
the discharge of raw and inadequately treated sewage into Lake 
Michigan. He held that the statutory remedies set out in various 
federal anti-pollution legislation were not the only federal remedies 
and standards available. The holding of the case remitted the par-
ties to an appropriate district court, the Court acting within its 
discretionary power to refuse cases under its original jurisdiction 
I 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
2 Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972). See also Burr, Toward Legal Rights for Animals, 4 ENV. AFF. 205 
(1975). 
3 405 U.S. 727, 741-42 (1972). 
• Id. at 744-45. 
sId. at 745-50. See also Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion (dissenting in part) in United States 
v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 701-03 (1973), in which he reiterated his belief that the members of 
SCRAP, who claimed an injury in fact from the allegedly discriminatory railroad rates set 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission on the shipment of recyclable materials, had stand-
ing to sue as persons injured by administrative action that affected the environment. C{. 
McDonald, The Relationship Between Substantive and Procedural Review under NEPA: A 
Case Study of SCRAP v. U.S., 4 ENV. AFF. 157 (1975). 
• 362 U.S. 482 (1960), noted in 1960 U. ILL. L. F. 469. 
7 384 U.S. 224 (1966). 
, Sections 10 and 13, 30 Stat. 1121, 1151-52, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 407 (1970). 
• 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
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when that jurisdiction is not mandatory. But, in so doing, the opin-
ion established the legitimacy of a valuable environmental protec-
tion remedy under federal non-statutory law. 
Perhaps the most misunderstood environmental opinion that Mr. 
Justice Douglas has written is Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas. lo Its 
very limited impact on exclusionary zoning concepts has been 
noted. 1I But fears, which are noted in the dissents, have persisted 
that the opinion encourages communities to prevent the develop-
ment of low-cost housing under the guise of protecting the quality 
of life, aesthetics, and the environment. Yet any fair reading of the 
Douglas opinion will reveal that he says nothing of this sort, as he 
carefully excludes from the effect of the case those types of suspect 
classifications that raise critical equal protection arguments. The 
opinion represents a variation of his earlier opinion in Berman v. 
Parker,12 in which he stated that protection of the spirit was as 
important as protection of the body, and that a state could take 
action under its police power for these spiritual purposes without 
hindrance of federal constitutional limitations of due process. This 
does not mean that Mr. Justice Douglas will overlook a taking with-
out due process when governmental action deprives a person of the 
use of his property. 13 But he does believe that the government, when 
regulating or taking, must consider spiritual as well as economic 
interests. Belle Terre resulted in a loss of substantial profits to land-
lords leasing to a group of unrelated students and in some inconve-
nience to the students themselves. It is well within reason to decide 
as the dissenters did that the restrictive local zoning was unconsti-
tutional. But Mr. Justice Douglas, finding no fundamental rights at 
issue, accepted as constitutional local regulations that provide for 
an attractive and spiritually living environment. It is unwise to read 
the opinion as saying more than it did. It merely restated his belief, 
in a suburban rather than wilderness area, that people can protect 
their environment if the fundamental rights of others are not vio-
lated. This is also the basis of his dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton, 14 
that man is entitled to an environment that lifts and gives strength 
to the spirit, and this is a value of sufficient importance not to be 
discarded for other speculative and noncritical values. Many people 
\0 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
11 E.G. Margolis, Exclusionary Zoning: For Whom Does Belle Terre Toll?, 11 CAL. WEST. 
L. REV. 85 (1974). See also 60 CORNELL L. REV. 299 (1975); 19 VILL. L. REV. 819 (1974). 
" 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
13 See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). 
14 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972). 
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disagree with the weight he gave these values in Belle Terre, but the 
values are those Mr. Justice Douglas has championed in his private 
and public, as well as his judicial life. 
A deep affection for nature, and recognition of the compelling 
need for using it with care, consideration, and respect, represent the 
best of America's environmental spirit. Refreshment comes from 
nature, even at and perhaps particularly at, its most harsh and 
unforgiving, and often in its most fragile state. Man is the benefici-
ary of this environment and it is for man that it must be protected. 
Economic forces must often bend to the need to protect the natural 
environment. Even a development, such as Mineral King in Sierra 
Club v. Morton,15 that brings more people into the type of contact 
with nature that a huge winter sports complex would provide, 
should not be permitted without a thorough and discerning consid-
eration of its effect on the present environment and the values peo-
ple who live in that environment find in it. Even if few people would 
use Mineral King in its undeveloped state, their values and aspira-
tions represent the best of man's spiritual goals and developments. 
This is a formidable and compelling philosophy of man's relation 
to nature, and Mr. Justice Douglas has not only expressed it in his 
writing and opinions but has lived it. No life can have a nobler 
theme. 
" Id. 
